A System Dynamics Model of Bitcoin: Mining as an Efficient Market and
  the Possibility of "Peak Hash" by Lasi, Davide & Saul, Lukas
A System Dynamics Model of Bitcoin:
Mining as an Efficient Market
and the Possibility of ‘Peak Hash’
Davide Lasi (lasi@mit.edu)1 and Lukas Saul (saul@hfut.edu.cn)2
1System Design & Management (SDM) Fellow, MIT
2Department of Electrical Science, Hefei University of Technology
18 April 2020
Abstract
The mining of bitcoin is modeled using system dynamics, showing
that the past evolution of the network hash rate can be explained to a
large extent by an efficient market hypothesis applied to the mining of
blocks. The possibility of a decrease in the network hash rate from the
next halving event (May 2020) is exposed, implying that the network
may be close to ’peak hash’, if the price of bitcoin and the revenues from
transaction fees will remain at approximately the present level.
1 Introduction
Bitcoin is the first publicly-issued cryptocurrency, introduced in 2008 by Satoshi
Nakamoto with a paper [1] that discloses not only the nuts and bolts of the
underlying technology, the blockchain, but also the expected dynamics of the
complex system created by the adoption of this new form of electronic money.
These dynamics are crucial because they are what make the bitcoin and other
cryptocurrencies robust, scalable, and secure. This paper aims to shed some
light on one of these dynamics, which is at the core of bitcoin’s security: the
mining of blocks.
By applying a modeling technique known as system dynamics [2, 3], the
evolution of the network hash rate is shown to be explainable, to a large extent,
with a simple efficient-market hypothesis, where bitcoin miners mine because of
the expected profit they make from mining, net of the cost of electricity. On the
one hand, this result is unimpressive and reassuring, in that it resonates well
with common sense. On the other hand, it may have significant implications on
the future evolution of the network hash rate.
In particular, if the profit from mining becomes negative as a consequence
of a price crash or of a dramatic fall in the reward, the network hash rate might
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drop significantly, because hashing power would be diverted to the mining of
more profitable alternative coins. This might be the case, for instance, in the
aftermath of the forthcoming halving of May, 2020, when the network could
have reached the ‘peak hash’. Possible consequences include higher volatility of
the bitcoin network hash rate, as well as security issues.
2 The Bitcoin and System Dynamics
System dynamics (SD) is an approach to the modeling of systems in terms of
stocks, flows, and feedback loops, introduced in the 60s by MIT’s Prof. Jay
Forrester [2]. It became very popular in the 70s thanks to the publication of
The Limits to Growth [3], a book that used an SD model to expose the futility
of the idea of infinite growth on a finite planet. Today, the most comprehensive
reference about system dynamics is the book Business Dynamics by MIT’s Prof.
John Sterman [3].
System dynamics can model both the technical and social aspects of the
complex systems established with the adoption of the bitcoin and other cryp-
tocurrencies. Therefore, it is a perfect approach to study the economic dynamics
of these new forms of money thanks to its ability to explain emergent systemic
phenomena in terms of interactions between factors related to both human be-
havior and (technical) system architecture.
Surprisingly, little attention has been paid so far to the bitcoin and other
cryptocurrencies by researchers in system dynamics. Only two studies so far
applied quantitative SD models to cryptocurrencies, presenting an Accounting
System Dynamics macroeconomic perspective on peer-to-peer monetary systems
[5, 6]. Neither of these studies, however, explicitly models or builds upon the
unique features of the bitcoin cryptocurrency system architecture.
This paper intends to show how SD can be both a powerful and accessible
tool to model the architecture of the blockchain and related market behaviors,
that is the technical and social aspects of the bitcoin as a complex system. The
power of SD in this context lies in the capability to integrate these aspects in
one model, and its accessibility in the visual representation of the model, in
terms of stocks, flows, and feedback loops, which make SD models intelligible
to a large audience.
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3 The Hypothesis
The model of this paper addresses: what does drive the growth of bitcoin mining
power (i.e., the network hash rate)? The hypothesis is that miners mine blocks
because they profit. In other words, because
Mining Revenues ≥ Mining Cost
where
Mining Revenues = (Subsidy + Transaction Fees) · BTC Price
Note that both sides of the first equation are in U.S. Dollars (USD) and
refer to the reward and cost of mining in monetary terms at the exchange rate
between Bitcoin (BTC) and USD at the time the block is mined. For reference,
the historical evolution of bitcoin price and transaction fees from the beginning
of the bitcoin to the date of writing is given (Fig. 1).
(a) Bitcoin price (in USD/BTC) (b) Transaction fees (in BTC)
Figure 1: Historical time series used as exogenous variable in the model. Source
of data and images: blockchain.com
In the simplified model of this paper, the operational cost of mining (OPEX)
is approximated just with the cost of the energy used in the mining process,
whereas other operational costs, as well as the original investment to purchase
and setup the mining hardware (CAPEX), are neglected. Finally, it is assumed
that energy is traded in a legal tender currency, USD, and therefore miners have
to sell bitcoin to pay the electricity bill.
This dynamic hypothesis further assumes an efficient market with perfect
information. As long as the mining profit is positive, more hashing power is
added to the network until the marginal cost of adding more hashing power
exceeds its expected return. Conversely, when the mining profit becomes neg-
ative, hash rate is subtracted from the network. The increase and decrease of
hash rate happens with a certain time constant, represented with a delay factor
(i.e., the adjustment is not instantaneous). In a first approximation, this delay
is assumed to be the same for both the increase and decrease of hashing rate,
although the latter is likely to be smaller than the former.
This hypothesis is a coarse simplification of reality, and therefore can only
provide a partial answer to the question of what drives the bitcoin network hash
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rate. Specifically, it assumes that all miners work for the immediate profit of
mining, and it does not consider that some (most?) miners may be willing to
invest even when the current revenues of mining are negative in the expectation
of the future returns from rising BTC price. Nevertheless, it is plausible that
the perspective of a present-time gain, at any time, is the dominant mechanism
underlying the decision of a miner whether or not to invest in additional mining
hardware, or mine bitcoin instead of another more rewarding cryptocurrency.
Furthermore, the same hypothesis is applied throughout the entire life of
the bitcoin, from the early days (January 2009) till now (April 2020). It is
obvious that the dynamics driving the mining of the bitcoin in the early days
were not the same of today. At the beginning, a true market barely existed,
and mining was performed by enthusiastic individuals with modest investment
in hardware infrastructure. Today, there is a market with ‘perfect information’
that is dominated by corporations with a stake in mining infrastructure worth
any million of USD. Hence, the model is expected to correlated with historic
data better in the late years than in the early years.
4 The Model
The model of this paper has been created with Vensim (Ventana Systems, Inc.),
and it is available at: github.com/davidelasi/bitcoin. The model is organized
in two views: Coin Creation and Hash Rate Adjustment. Certain variables of
the system are treated as exogenous variables, meaning that neither their value
is determined by the state of other variables of the system, nor they take part
in feedback loops.
The following historical time series are exogenous (inputs) to the model:
• Bitcoin price [in USD/BTC]
• Revenues from transaction fees [in BTC/Day]
• Energy efficiency of state of the art mining hardware [in GH/J]
The latter is based on our synthesis of a multitude of internet sources that are
too many to be mentioned here (from Wikipedia to old pages of other websites
and forums about the energy efficiency of mining hardware).
The model correlation is performed by comparing selected model outputs
with the historical time series:
• Height of the Blockchain [in blocks]
• BTC in circulation [in BTC]
• Hash Rate [in GH/s]
The first two are used only as a model sanity check, whereas the last one is used
for model correlation. The correlation of the model has been performed both
manually and using the optimization capabilities of Vensim DSS.
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The model structure is discussed in detail in the following sections. The
following conventions are used: variable names are capitalized, and constant
names are all capital. Exogenous variables are highlighted in gray in the figures.
Bitcoin is abbreviated as BTC.
4.1 Coins Creation
The creation of bitcoins is modelled as shown in Fig. 2. This diagram represents
the mechanism of controlled supply devised by Satoshi Nakamoto.
There is a finite stock of 21,000,000 Total BTC, whose content flows into a
second stock of BTC in Circulation with a certain creation rate. This creation
rate is given by the product of two factors: how many blocks are mined per day,
and how much subsidy (in BTC) is granted for each mined block. The former
is assumed to correspond to the Target Block Creation Rate of 1 block every 10
min (144 blocks / day), and the latter is a geometric series following the process
that is hard-coded in the bitcoin software: an initial subsidy of 50 BTC per
mined block, that is halved every 210,00 blocks until the value of the subsidy
reaches the minimum bitcoin-transaction unit of 0.00000001 BTC, commonly
known as ‘1 Satoshi’.
This part of the model does not include any dynamic loop. No feedback is
present, and with respect of the dynamic hypothesis current under investigation,
the only connections to the higher layer of the model are through the variables
BTC Subsidy per Mined Block and Target Block Creation Rate, which are used
to compute the Revenues from Subsidy.
Figure 2: Coin Creation model view.
5
4.2 Hash Rate Adjustment
The addition of hash rate to the bitcoin network is modeled as shown in Fig.
3. The negative feedback loop is the manifestation of the effect of the efficient-
market hypothesis set forth earlier.
Figure 3: Hash Rate Adjustment model view. Exogenous variables in gray.
The network Hash Rate (GH/s) is a stock with a Net Inflow of Hash Rate
representing the amount of computational power that is daily added or sub-
tracted from the network. The Hash Rate at time zero is set to 0.007 GH/s,
according to some estimation of the original computational power available to
Satoshi Nakamoto in the early days of bitcoin [7]. From the Hash Rate, the
number of Daily Hashes (GH/day) computed by the network is calculated.
The Mining Cost is determined by the Hashing Cost, expressed in $/GH
and given by the quotient between the Price of Energy ($/J) and the Energy
Efficiency of State of the Art Mining Hardware (GH/J). The Price of Energy
is assumed to be constant over the studied time period at 0.05 $/kWh. This
is a simplification that may not be fully representative of the average price of
energy used by miners in the early days, although it seems to be aligned with
the present (according to [8], 0.04 $/kWh).
The Energy Efficiency of State of the Art Mining Hardware is modeled as
a constant level in different epochs of mining. Seven periods are identified, from
the times of the CPU to the most-recent ASIC technology (Table 1 and Fig. 4).
At the end of each period, the variable assumes the value of the next period,
as if the whole network would immediately switch to the new technology at
once. This is not realistic and creates discontinuities in the time series, as the
difference of this variable between consecutive period is often of the order of
10x. The model could be easily improved by adding further elements to model
the typical S-shaped (logistic function) pattern of new technology’s diffusion.
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Technology From (date) Period (days) Energy efficiency (MH/J)
CPU Mar 2009 0–600 0.1
GPU Oct 2010 600–1,000 1
FPGA Dec 2011 1,000–1,400 10
ASIC (110 nm) Jan 2013 1,400–1,550 100
ASIC (55 nm) Jun 2013 1,550–1,900 500
ASIC (28 nm) Jun 2014 1,900–2,450 1,000
ASIC (16 nm) Dec 2015 2,450–Now 10,000
Table 1: Evolution of state-of-the-art mining hardware
Figure 4: Energy efficiency evolution of state-of-the-art mining hardware.
The Mining Revenues are calculated by summing the Revenues from Sub-
sidy and from transaction fees, and converting them into $. This calculation
uses a mix of endogenous and exogenous factors: the subsidy is calculated based
on the variables modelled in the ‘Coins Creation’ view described in the previ-
ous section, whereas the transaction fees and the BTC price are extracted from
historic data series mentioned earlier.
Subtracting the cost from the revenues of mining, the Mining Profit is
calculated. This determines the amount of Hash Rate Shortfall, that is how
much hashing power could be added before the marginal cost of adding more
will exceed the benefit (a situation of zero-profit that is the goal of the negative
feedback loop):
Hash Rate Shortfall =
Mining Profit
Cost of Energy · Energy Efficiency of Mining Hardware
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In other words, the profit that the network makes every day ($/day, ex-
pressed in $/s) is converted into an amount of energy (J/s) that the network
could afford to add before reaching a zero-profit situation. This amount of
energy, in turn, corresponds to a certain amount of hashing power (GH/s) cal-
culated through the Energy Efficiency of State of the Art Mining Hardware that
is available at any given time (GH/J).
At last, the key factor involved in this loop is introduced: the Hash Rate
Adjustment Time. This accounts for the fact that the system does not react
instantaneously to a shortfall in hash rate, for instance, because the supply chain
of mining hardware is (notoriously) limited in its throughput. This parameter
is the only one that is acted upon for the correlation of the model results by
comparing the calculated hash rate with the historical time series.
5 Results and Discussion
The results and discussion are divided into three sections about model correla-
tion, insights about the past, and speculations about the future. Table 2 maps
the number of days of the simulation to calendar dates and relevant events, to
help with the interpretation of the results.
Time (day) Date Comment
0 3 Jan 2009 Mining of the genesis block
500 May 2010 Introduction of GPU miners
1,000 Sep 2011 Introduction of FPGA miners
1,500 Feb 2013 Introduction of 1st gen. ASIC
2,500 Nov 2015 Introduction of 4th gen. ASIC
3,300 Dec 2017 Bitcoin grazes the 20,000 $/BTC price mark
3,700 Feb 2019 –
4,100 Mar 2020 Latest update of this model
Table 2: Evolution of state-of-the-art mining hardware
5.1 Model Sanity Check and Correlation
A sanity check of the model is performed by comparing the height of the
blockchain calculated by the model with the actual historical time series (Fig.
5). The comparison is satisfactory, showing that the Coin Creation part of the
model works as expected.
The correlation of the model with historical data series has been performed
by tuning the value of the Hash Rate Adjustment Time manually, and through
the automated optimization routines, until reaching a satisfactory matching
between the calculated and the historical time series of the hash rate.
By using a single value for the Hash Rate Adjustment Time throughout
the whole time series, an optimal result can be found at 1112 days, but a poor
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Figure 5: Evolution of the height of the blockchain over time (model vs reality).
correlation is obtained, particularly in the last three years (Fig. 6a). The
situation can be significantly improved by allowing for the possibility that the
delay time of the feedback loop changes at some point (i.e., IF time ¡ value
THEN use delay time 1 ELSE use delay time 2). The optimal fit occurs for
a delay time of 1482 days from time 0 to 3,777 and only 264 days from time
3,777 to 4,100 (Fig. 6b). The rest of the results in this paper are relative to
this second scenario.
(a) Correlation with one delay value.
(b) Correlation with two delay values.
Figure 6: Model correlation with Hash Rate Adjustment Time: top row 1112
days; bottom row, 1482 days (time 0 – 3,777) and 264 days (time 3,777 – 4,100).
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In general, the correlation can be considered good enough to gain some
insights from this model, especially considering its simplicity, with the following
provisos:
• The Hashing Rate Adjustment Loop does not capture well the dynamics
of the system in the early days (0-1,500 days) dominated by CPU, GPU,
and FGPA miners. Model improvements are needed to use it for this
period. For example, the diffusion of new technologies could be modeled
to allow for a gradual implementation of the newer generation of mining
hardware, particularly in the early days, rather than as a step function.
This could reduce the tendency of the model to overestimate the hash rate
in the early days, and it would also avoid discontinuities in the hash rate
as for time 2,450 in Fig. 6. Also, a better estimate of the Price of Energy
of the miners in the early days, which as certainly higher on average than
0.05$/kWh, would help.
• The model reasonably captures the main dynamics of the system from time
1,500 on, which is in the epoch of ASIC miners; however, some dynamics
are not represented by the model (e.g., the peak in Hash Rate around
time 3,600). To capture these ‘modes’, one would need to envisage and
implement additional feedback loops working together with the Hashing
Rate Adjustment Loop.
• Using two different adjustment times with an IF THEN condition is a
‘quick and dirty’ trick, which is generally considered ‘bad practice’ in a
system dynamics model. The need to use such a ‘trick’ is symptomatic
of the fact that the Hash Rate Adjustment Time might be, itself, part of
other feedback loops that are currently not modeled, which would justify
the change of this variable with time. For example, the delay’s decrease
could be due to the reinvestment of mining profits in new technology or
the enhancement of the supply chain of existing technologies.
In summary, there are several opportunities to extend and improve this
model by identifying and implementing these additional loops. Yet, this simple
model is sufficiently complex to gain relevant insights about the system while
avoiding the risk of over-fitting the data.
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5.2 Insights About The Past
Having established a reasonable correlation between the model and the reality,
the analysis of the simulation results gives further insights on the past evolution
of bitcoin mining and the related market dynamics:
• The long delay time of the feedback loop until ten years (day 3,777) from
the genesis block, means that there was much more potential demand than
supply of mining hardware. In other words, even if mining was a great
deal financially speaking, procuring as much hashing power as it would
financially make sense from a pure present-day profit consideration, was
never possible. The long delay time of hash rate addition is also in line with
the lived experience that mining hardware has always been a (relatively)
scarce resource, and further invalidates some efficient-market hypothesis
models which would overestimate hash rate growth.
• The jump to a much lower delay time of the feedback loop that occurred
around mid-2019, from 1,482 to 264 days, is also aligned with some factual
evidence. In particular, in 2019, new mining hardware with 5x the hashing
power per unit sold compared to the previous state-of-the-art hardware
became available [8]. This ratio matches quite well with the ratio between
the two delays time, which is 5.6, and it would be compatible with the
same supply chain delivering approximately the same ‘flow’ of miners (in
units) but a 5x bigger flow of mining power (in hash rate).
• Until late 2019, there was always a positive shortfall of hashing power in
the network, with the biggest spike matching the time of highest bitcoin
price and transaction fees. Compare Fig. 7 with Fig. 1. The profit from
mining, expressed in the simplistic terms of this paper as same-day rev-
enues minus operational costs accounting for the cost of energy, was always
positive, until the last few months. The current price of 7,000 $/BTC
is likely to be close to the marginal cost of production of a bitcoin in the
present conditions. The latter point, in particular, calls for some thinking
about the future and the reaction of the system to the forthcoming halving
event, in about a month from the time of writing.
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Figure 7: The Hash Rate shortfall that drives the negative feedback loop, and
the mining economy in terms of revenues, cost, and profit (results for past time).
5.3 Speculations About The Future
Using a model correlated with past data to attempt to predict the future is
always a tricky endeavor. This is true for this model as well for two reasons.
First, because it is a simple model with only one feedback loop it may not
capture all the dynamics of the system. Second, because the model correlation is
performed with past data that were almost always relative to a growing network
hash rate, and there is no guarantee that the same dynamics work when the
market would turn in a different direction. In fact, the limited ability of the
model to represent the ‘mode’ of the peak at 3,600 days (to the right in Fig. 6)
signals that different dynamics might apply to a decrease of the network hash
rate.
With this necessary premise, the temptation to apply the model to a hy-
pothetical future is irresistible. Therefore, we have exercised the model after a
hypothetical future scenario where the price of bitcoin and the revenues from
transaction fees remain at an average level close to the recent time’s. This
scenario is interesting because the current profit from mining, net of the cost
of energy, is nearly zero (Fig. 8), meaning that the hashing power may have
reached a status of equilibrium at the present level of revenues from the subsidy
and the transaction fees. Therefore, it is interesting to see that this equilibrium
12
might be perturbed by the forthcoming halving of the subsidy.
Specifically, we have extended the model operation from day 4,100 to 7,500
with the following assumption:
• The Future BTC Price fluctuates around an average level of 7,300 $/BTC.
This is represented with a pink-noise time series (std deviation 500 $/BTC
and correlation time of 28 days).
• The Future Revenues from Transaction Fees fluctuate around an average
level of 30 BTC/day. This is also represented with a pink-noise time series
(std deviation 5 BTC/day and correlation time of 28 days).
All these assumptions are of course arbitrary, and one could play with any
different set of assumption.
The Energy Efficiency of State of the Art Mining Hardware is kept con-
stant at today’s value, which is probably not too far off from reality in the
short term, considering that orders of magnitude improvements of the present
ASIC technology are unlikely to happen (although in the long-term quantum
computing might be a game changer). While bitcoin mining spurs further tech-
nological advancement along the lines of Moore’s law, we don’t expect massive
technological changes to affect this system dynamics model. To put it another
way, the constraint of reduction of coinbase reward is expected to dominate over
technological leaps in hashing efficiency.
Fig. 8 shows the projected future evolution of the revenues, costs, and
profits from mining, and the evolution of the Hash Rate Shortfall determines
the operation of the negative feedback loop of the model. The results show a
quick switch to negative-profit for block mining at the next two halving events,
and particularly at the next one, when the mining subsidy will be cut in half
for the third time, from 12.5 to 6.25 BTC per block. Correspondingly, the Hash
Rate Shortfall becomes negative, to indicate that the network has an excess
of hash rate, which makes the cost of mining higher than the revenues that it
generates. In other words, should the (dollar) revenues from mining remain at
today’s level, mining will suddenly start to become unprofitable an unprofitable
business until the difficulty goes down because of a reduction of the network
hash rate.
The feedback loop of the model, based on the efficient-market hypothesis
set forth at the beginning of the paper, operates by reducing the hash power
of the network until the net profit from mining will tend again to zero. The
difference from the past is that, for the first time, the hash rate would tend to
its equilibrium state from the bottom instead of the top.
In the current model, the adjustment time of the net inflow hash rate is the
same, regardless of the sign (i.e., addition or removal of hash rate). However,
it is likely that the removal of hash rate will take place with a much shorter
adjustment time, because it is much easier to switch off a mining hardware or use
it for another purpose (e.g., switch to another cryptocurrency) than to procure
and set it up. This could be implemented by considering different inflow and
outflow of hash rate from the Hash Rate stock (currently modeled as a single
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Figure 8: The Hash Rate shortfall that drives the negative feedback loop, and
the mining economy in terms of revenues, cost, and profit (future projection, see
the text for details about the assumed revenues from subsidy and transactions).
net flow, see Fig. 3). This effect is not considered in the model, but it can be
added in the future if the network hash rate will indeed start to drop. Hence
there will be data to correlate this ‘mode’ of the system (in fact, there may
already be some data to try to do so using the peak of hash rate at 3,600 days,
to the right in Fig. 6).
This brings us to the last final question of this work: has the bitcoin reached
the ‘peak hash’? That is, has the bitcoin reached the situation where the cost of
mining is higher than the revenues from mining? Possibly, as the projection of
the future evolution of the hash rate in Fig. 9 shows. Under the future (halved)
value of the subsidy, the equilibrium hash rate of the system might be closer to
60B GH/s than to the current 110 GH/s.
If that will be the case, a most interesting question will be: where will all
that excess hashing power be invested, and how this might change the landscape
of the bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies? Could the bitcoin and other networks’
hash rate experience higher volatility of hash rate after the next halving event?
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Figure 9: Peak hash (present time = 4100).
May such a staggeringly large amount of hashing power that could potentially
flee from the bitcoin network in the long-term be a threat to the security of
the network (or other SHA256 secured coins such as BCH and BSV), if ever it
would suddenly come back?
Of course, a number of events may allow for a smooth transition between the
current and the next reward era, such as significant improvements in the energy
efficiency of the mining hardware, access to yet cheaper energy, or substantial
inflation of bitcoin price and transaction fees. Some of these changes (e.g.,
increase in block size) and trends (e.g., increase in transaction fees) have been
already happening in the past. But one thing seems true: the effect of the
forthcoming halving might be different and have deeper consequences than the
previous, so it is worth making sure that the bitcoin, as a dynamical system, is
prepared for this transition.
Finally, it is worth considering what could be an alternative model of coin
supply that would not have incurred this (hypothetical) peak of hash rate. In
2014, for instance, a cryptocurrency based on a continuous logarithmic coin
release mechanism was released: the Woodcoin [10], which replaces bitcoin’s
geometric series reduction of coinbase rewards with a harmonic series. Such a
mechanism, among others, ensures a slower overall rate of coinbase reduction,
changing the system dynamics especially in the longer term. While the “halv-
ing” system of a geometric series reduction of coinbase chosen by Satoshi has
been popular among other public currencies (e.g. XMR, LTC), a System Dy-
namics model could tell us more about how other choices of currency issuance
will affect the hash rate and future security of the system.
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6 Conclusions
We have shown that aspects of bitcoin mining can be modeled as a dynamical
system using system dynamics. Starting with a dynamical hypothesis based on
an efficient-markets hypothesis applied to the mining of blocks, we have shown
how the recent evolution of the bitcoin network has rate can be explained by a
negative feedback dynamic loop that zeroes on mining profit with a delay time.
By extending the simulation into the future to cover the next two reward
eras, under the assumption of constant bitcoin price and revenues from transac-
tion fees approximately at the level of April 2020, we have shown how there is
a possibility that the next halving event lead to a transition to an unprofitable
mining regime with an excess of network hash rate. This may imply that we
might be at the ‘peak hash’, and experience a continuous decline of the hash
rate (and difficulty) in the coming years.
Finally, this model shows that system dynamics methods and tools can be
effective to model the bitcoin and could be applied to other existing or new
proposed cryptocurrencies as well to understand the behavior of the complex
sociotechnical systems that are created from the application of blockchain tech-
nology to electronic money and other applications enabled by shared ledger. It
is worth noting the relative success that the model enjoys with historical data,
especially considering that there is no way to verify how many people are mining
nor what hardware is available to them.
Future Work
Despite a decade of practice, the theory behind public proof-of-work ledgers
remains in its infancy. There are many additional tweaks possible to the system
dynamics we have presented here, including more complex models of mining
efficiencies, other currency release curves (other coins), and modeling the effect
of market shocks. The initial applicability of the model leaves us expecting much
more from future work using system dynamics to understand the evolution of
the public proof-of-work consensus network.
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